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ABSTRACT
Objective: To explore the causes of failure to activate
the rapid response system (RRS). The organisation
has a recognised incidence of staff failing to act when
confronted with a deteriorating patient and leading to
adverse outcomes.
Design: A multi-method study using the following:
a point prevalence survey to determine the incidence of
abnormal simple bedside observations and activation
of the rapid response team by clinical staff;
a prospective audit of all patients experiencing
a cardiac arrest, unplanned intensive care unit
admission or death over an 8-week period; structured
interviews of staff to explore cognitive and
sociocultural barriers to activating the RRS.
Setting: Southern Health is a comprehensive healthcare
network with 570 adult in-patient beds across four
metropolitan teaching hospitals in the south-eastern
sector of Melbourne.
Measurements: Frequency of physiological instability
and outcomes within the in-patient hospital population.
Qualitative data from staff interviews were thematically
coded.
Results: The incidence of physiological instability in the
acute adult population was 4.04%. Nearly half of these
patients (42%) did not receive an appropriate clinical
response from the staff, despite most (69.2%)
recognising their patient met physiological criteria for
activating the RRS, and being ‘quite’, or ‘very’
concerned about their patient (75.8%). Structured
interviews with 91 staff members identiﬁed
predominantly sociocultural reasons for failure to
activate the RRS.
Conclusions: Despite an organisational commitment to
the RRS, clinical staff act on local cultural rules within
the clinical environment that are usually not explicit.
Better understanding of these informal rules may lead
to more appropriate activation of the RRS.
OBJECTIVE
Failure of bedside hospital clinical staff to
follow established treatment protocols has
been identiﬁed as a common factor in
patients having an adverse event during their
hospitalisation. Post hoc analysis
1 of the data
from the Australian Quality and Health Care
Study (AQHCS)
2 found that ‘that misappli-
cation of, or failure to apply a rule; or use of
a bad or inadequate rule’ and ‘violation of
a protocol or rule’ together occurred in 13.6%
of the adverse events identiﬁed in the
AQHCS. These two iterative categories of
adverse event causation were associated with
death or permanent disability in 26% and
28% respectively of adverse events identiﬁed
in the AQHCS. Of most concern, the authors
rated the degree of preventability of these two
causation categories at 90% and 80% respec-
tively based on the actual adverse events in the
AQHCS. Likewise, a number of smaller mostly
retrospective single institution studies have
found various associations between failure to
follow established treatment protocols and
guidelines for clinically deteriorating patients
and increased mortality.
3e7
One strategy to counter the problem of in-
hospital adverse events has been the use of the
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Original researchrapid response system (RRS) to manage clinically deteri-
orating patients. In essence a RRS has two essential
components: ﬁrst an afferent arm that is a system of rules
that determine the criteria for activation of the rapid
response team; and second, the efferent arm which is the
system of response once the activation criteria are
breached. Varying types of RRS are now common in many
European, North American and Australasian hospitals.
8 9
In its simplest form a RRS is merely a rule or protocol that
requires the bedside clinical staff to comply with the crit-
ical requirement of activating the RRS for it to be of
beneﬁt.
10 In the Medical Emergency Response Interven-
tion Trial (MERIT).
11 there was a signiﬁcant rate of failure
to activate such a system in the control and intervention
hospitals that may have contributed to the equivocal
results of the study. Speciﬁcally, in the 11 control hospitals
over the 6-month study there were 246 cardiac arrests. In
44% of these arrests the bedside staff did not activate an
emergency response despite the observations fulﬁlling the
response criteria for an emergency team call. Similarly, of
the 12 hospitals assigned to the RRS intervention, there
was still a failure rate of 30% to activate the RRS in the
250 cardiac arrests that occurred.
Anecdotally, failure to activate the RRS has been
thought to be associated with inadequate education
about recognition of clinically deteriorating patients or
insufﬁcient knowledge of the RRS. In support of this is
a post hoc analysis of the MERIT data
12 that indicates an
inverse relationship between the frequency of emer-
gency response team calls (in the control and interven-
tion hospitals) and the primary outcome measures of
cardiac arrest, critical unit admission and hospital
mortality. Similarly, Santamaria et al
13 reported data from
one of the intervention hospitals of the MERIT study
5 years after the study suggesting that an intervention
like a RRS takes years not months to derive beneﬁts.
Theoretically then, the rate of RRS activation should be
high in a system where it has been in place for many
years and the clinical staff have adequate training.
In 2007 the Quality and Safety Unit, Southern Health,
Melbourne identiﬁed 11 sentinel cases in which signiﬁ-
cant patient harm occurred in association with the failure
of bedside staff to call the medical emergency team. This
was despite the fact that our organisation had a mature
policy and procedure in place for the activation of the
RRS that has been well established with an organisational
commitment to its use.
14 15 Attempts to rationalise and
pattern-match the underlying features of these incidents
using clinical reviews and root cause analyses were
unsuccessful. There appeared to be no obvious cause in
terms of poor staff training, lack of motivation or under-
standing of the patients’ clinical states.
16
While previous studies
17e21 have documented the
incidence of failure of bedside clinical staff to activate an
emergency response team, to our knowledge no study
has investigated the reasons why staff do not activate the
RRS. As such, we undertook a multi-method examina-
tion to determine the incidence of clinical staff failing to
call the RRS and the human and sociological factors that
may be involved.
DESIGN
Ethics approval
The Southern Health Research and Ethics Committee
exempted this study from requiring ethics approval
because it fulﬁlled the NHMRC criteria for a quality
assurance project.
Methods and participants
We have previously published the methodology for this
study.
22 In summary there were three parts to this study.
Point prevalence study of missed RRS incidence
On 17 April 2009 between 11:00 and 12:00 all adult
inpatient observation charts were reviewed (excluding
critical care areas such as intensive care units (ICUs),
high dependency units, the emergency department and
the theatre complex). Evidence of documented physio-
logical instability as deﬁned by the RRS activation
criteria (table 1) was determined by review of the patient
observation charts over the previous 24 h. If patients
fulﬁlled these physiological criteria then the actions of
the staff in response to clinical instability were recorded.
If the RRS was not activated when RRS activation criteria
were met, the event was termed a ‘missed RRS call’.
Prospective study of missed RRS calls
Over an 8-week period from 26 April to 7 July 2009 all
cardiac arrests and unplanned ICU admissions from the
ward areas were examined to determine if the patient
fulﬁlled the activation criteria for a RRS call (table 1) for
Table 1 The rapid response system physiological criteria
or triggers
Airway Respiratory distress
Threatened airway
Breathing Respiratory rate >30 breaths per min
Respiratory rate <6 breaths per min
Oxygen saturation <90% on oxygen
Difﬁculty speaking
Circulation Blood pressure <90 mm Hg despite
treatment
Pulse rate >130 beats per min
Neurology Decreased level of consciousness
Fitting
Other Concerned
Need for treatment and prompt help
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event. In the event that the RRS was not activated, all the
clinical staff involved were interviewed (see below) and
these events were also labelled ‘missed RRS call’.
Interviews of staff members involved in missed RRS calls
The clinical staff involved in ‘missed RRS calls’ in the
ﬁrst two parts of the study were interviewed (online
appendix 1). These staff members included the junior
medical and nursing staff and members of the medical
emergency or intensive care teams that were called to
assist. The interview questions were derived from the
cognitive theory of situation awareness
23 and from brief
open-ended questions designed to explore the socio-
cultural barriers identiﬁed in health systems.
24
Quantitative data were recorded as frequency data as
this was an exploratory study and not designed to
distinguish adverse event rates among clinical areas.
Interview responses were coded independently by two
coders for themes and the coding system iteratively
developed until agreement was achieved.
25
Setting
Southern Health is a comprehensive university tertiary
healthcare provider for the south-eastern suburbs of
Melbourne. Over 13000 staff service a catchment popu-
lation of 880000 and provide acute health services at four
hospital sites; all acute services are provided with the
exception of burns, spinal injury and major organ trans-
plantation. Southern Health was an early and enthusiastic
adopter of the RRS with establishment of the medical
emergency team in one hospital in 1996. This resulted in
substantial and signiﬁcant improvements in patient
outcome
14 15 and this system of care was standardised
throughout the organisation by 2006. Additionally our
organisation committed to training all junior members of
clinical staff in the purpose built simulation centre.
26
RESULTS
Incidence of physiological and missed RRS calls
On the day of the point prevalence study, 23 (4.04%)
patients fulﬁlled the activation criteria for a RRS call in
the 24 h before the index event according to the 570
observation charts that were surveyed (table 2). The RRS
was not activated in 10 (1.75%) of these patients (missed
RRS call). The research team activated the RRS for one
patient who was subsequently admitted to the ICU and
underwent emergency surgery that day. Hypotension and
oxygen de-saturation were the most common reasons for
RRS call activation (73.3% and 80.0% respectively).
Prospective identiﬁcation of missed RRS calls
Over the prospective study period a further 31 cases were
identiﬁed across the four acute hospital sites (table 2).
Interviews of clinical staff involved in a missed RRS call
Incomplete qualitative data were obtained from 8 of the
91 interviews for questions relating to sociocultural
barriers to activation of the RRS and so were not used.
Table 2 Adverse event and rapid response system (RRS) data collected from the point prevalence study and the prospective
study period
Casey Clayton Dandenong Moorabbin Total
Frequency (per 1000 bed days)
Point prevalence study
Acute adult patients 59 287 177 47 570
Patients who
met RRS activation criteria
0 13 8 2 23 (4.04%)
Missed RRS calls 0 5 3 2 10 (1.75%)
Prospective study
Bed days 2643 13719 (8 weeks) 16756 (10 weeks) 3642 36760
RRS activation 14 (5.30) 142 (10.4) 180 (10.7) 21 (5.67) 357 (9.71)
Cardiac arrest calls 2 (0.76) 36 (2.62) 15 (0.90) 1 (0.27) 54 (1.47)
Unplanned ICU admission 0 15 (1.09) 8 (0.48) 2 (0.55) 25 (0.68)
ICU admission following
RRS/cardiac arrest call
1 (0.38) 69 (5.03) 52 (3.10) 5 (1.37) 127 (3.45)
Death 0 4 (0.29) 3 (0.18) 0 7 (0.19)
Missed RRS callsdlate
RRS calls/ICU admissions/deaths
0 20 (1.46) 10 (0.60) 1 (0.27) 31 (0.84)
Interviews from missed RRS calls 0 58 (26 nurses,
18 medical staff,
14 ICU nursing
and medical staff)
32 (17 nurses,
11 medical staff,
4 ICU nursing
and medical staff)
1 (junior
medical
staff)
91 (qualitative
data available
from 83)
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Even though they did not activate the RRS, the majority
of staff in the prospective study (63 of 91, 69%) recog-
nised that the patients met the calling criteria. Further-
more, 69 of the 91 respondents (75.8%) were either
‘quite concerned’ (33 of 91, 36.3%) or ‘very concerned’
(36 of 91, 39.6%) about their patient at this time.
Fifty-seven respondents (62%) were unaware that their
patient had been classiﬁed as a missed RRS, and of these,
27 (47.4%) thought the patient would deteriorate
despite treatment.
Sociocultural barriers of failure to activate RRS
Ten themes were identiﬁed in the responses of staff
involved with missed RRS calls. The staff believed they
would be perceived by their nursing and medical
colleaguesinsimilarwayshadtheyactivatedtheRRS.Many
stated their colleagues would be supportive of whatever
actions they felt necessary (40 of 83, 48.2% for nursing
colleagues, 21 of 83, 25.3% for medical colleagues) with
fewer concerned there would be a negative or hostile
response (11 of83, 13.3% for nursing colleagues and 22 of
83, 26.5% for medical colleagues) (ﬁgure 1).
One of the main barriers given by respondents was
a feeling that they should be able to manage patients by
themselves on the ward (34 of 83, 41.0% for nursing staff
and 33 of 83, 39.8% for medical staff).
Actions and explanations for the delay of activation of the RRS
When activation of the RRS was delayed four themes were
identiﬁed, including the need to wait for further investi-
gations, and treatment and reviews by the treating and
ICU teams. (table 3). When the RRS was not activated at
all a further eight themes were identiﬁed (table 3). The
most common of these were that the RRS did not need to
be activated and that the assembled team had the neces-
sary expertise. This was most commonly noted when the
physiological instability was in the area of expertise of the
treating team (eg, tachycardia on the cardiology ward).
A signiﬁcant proportion of interviewees (25 of 83, 30.1%)
believed the patient had already been discussed with the
ICU team and felt that continued responsibility for the
patient was unclear.
DISCUSSION
Principle ﬁndings
On the day of the point prevalence study, 1 in 25 patients
across the four acute care hospitals fulﬁlled the activa-
tion criteria for the RRS. The RRS was not activated in
42% of instances, despite the maturity of the RRS and
educational support for its use in our organisation.
Interviews with staff involved with missed RRS calls
revealed that, even though they did not activate the RRS,
nearly three-quarters of respondents recognised that
their patients met the RRS activation criteria and
a similar proportion were concerned about their
patients’ wellbeing. In these situations the bedside staff
took other actions to manage their patients, which in
most cases involved further investigations, treatments or
clinical reviews (table 3). Of concern though, a minority
of respondents (nurses 13% and doctors 26%) were
concerned about a negative or hostile reaction from
colleagues for activating the RRS.
The most common reason for failure to activate the
RRS was that the bedside staff felt that the clinical situ-
ation was under control in the ward setting. The second
most common reason was that the critical care team had
already been involved but that there were no critical care
beds available. Less common reasons were a feeling that
the bedside clinical team had enough experience to
manage the situation without activating the RRS; poor
communication and prioritisation by the medical team
involved; and failure to repeat abnormal observations.
Taken together these reasons suggest that although staff
recognised that their patients were in difﬁculty, they
elected not to activate the RRS while further clinical
investigations and clinical reviews were pending. Half of
respondents felt that the clinical situation was under
control in the ward setting. To a certain extent, data
from the point prevalence study validate the experience
of the bedside clinical staff; namely that among the 23
patients who met RRS activation criteria, only one had
a serious adverse event. The other 22 patients had no
adverse consequences irrespective of whether the RRS
was activated or not. These results suggest that from the
perspective of bedside staff there is not sufﬁcient ‘face
validity’ in the sensitivity and speciﬁcity of the RRS acti-
vation criteria. Therefore bedside staff re-prioritise the
requirement for RRS activation based on the particular
clinical scenario, taking into account a multitude of
Figure 1 Thematic analysis of responses to the question:
‘How would you think you would be perceived by your nursing/
medical colleagues if you called a MET call now?’
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gations, the perceived competence of attending medical
staff, and the degree of involvement of critical care or
critical outreach. However, one RRS missed call resulted
in prolonged critical care admission with multiple
reoperations. Potentially, if timely RRS activation had
occurred this could have been avoided. Therefore, from
an administrative and more speciﬁcally critical care view-
point, prevention of these types of critical admissions is of
huge beneﬁt to the patient and the hospital as a whole.
However, from the viewpoint of bedside staff, in most
instances of RRS activation breach, the patients come to
no harm. This may explain why it takes so long for the
RRS to be completely accepted within the culture of
a particular hospital system, simply because the frequency
of useful RRS activations is low and that it takes years for
bedside staff to accept and value such a system.
An additional but less common reason for not acti-
vating the RRS was prior involvement of critical care
teams in the management of patients who fulﬁlled acti-
vation criteria. Thirty per cent of respondents stated that
if the critical care team had been involved with the
patient (and particularly if no critical care bed was
available) then the requirement for a RRS call was
negated. This may reﬂect a perception that critical care
teams should manage critically ill patients in the critical
care unit and that other critically ill patients in the
hospital should be managed by other clinical teams with
the assistance of the critical care team.
Across the four hospitals in this study there was
a different pattern of events during the study period.
Casey, one of the newer (2002) smaller community
hospitals with no on-site critical care service, had 18 RRS
activations, none of which were assessed as being missed.
The other smaller hospital, Moorabbin, an elective
surgical facility that also has no on-site critical care service,
had 22 RRS activations but only one missed RRS call. In
contrast, the two large acute tertiary referral centres
accounted for almost all the missed RRS calls and
accounted for all but one of the subsequent interviews.
Although both hospitals had a similar RRS activation rate
the incidence of missed RRS calls was much less at
Dandenong (0.60 vs 1.46 events per 1000 acute adult bed
days). As such, the majority of the staff interviews took
place at Clayton. Also, at Dandenong, the incidence of
cardiac arrest calls and unplanned critical care admissions
was less than half that at Clayton. This may reﬂect
a difference in case mix at these two hospitals as Clayton
has a number of tertiary specialty referral units
(neurology, renal, cardiac and neuro-surgery) that are not
present at Dandenong. Alternatively, these differences
may be because Dandenong had a RRS in place for 13
years at the time of the study whereas the RRS at Clayton
had only been in place for 3 years. Despite this, there were
still 13 missed RRS calls across the point prevalence and
prospective parts of this study at Dandenong.
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
The main limitation of this study was the relatively low
incidence of missed RRS calls that could be explained by
the maturity of the RRS system. Consequently fewer
interviews than anticipated could be performed during
Table 3 Thematic analysis of structured interview responses from the prospective data collection phase. All patients
experienced a missed RRS call with an adverse clinical event
Characteristics of interviewees Frequency of responses (n[83), n (%)
Junior ward nurse 28 (33.7)
Senior ward nurse 16 (19.3)
Junior doctor (intern/resident) 16 (19.3)
Senior doctor (registrar/consultant) 13 (15.7)
Other (eg ICU outreach nurse) 18 (21.7)
Actions performed prior to activating RRS
Awaited further review or response by medical staff 43 (51.8)
Speciﬁc treatment or investigations delaying RRS activation 42 (50.6)
Involved ICU outreach or requested ICU review 28 (33.7)
Involved senior nursing staff 10 (12.0)
Explanation as to why RRS was not activated
Felt the situation was under control in the ward setting 45 (54.2)
ICU team already involved but no ICU bed was available 25 (30.1)
Team involved were experienced in this type of patient and
felt RRS activation was not required
14 (16.9)
Poor communication/prioritisation by medical team 13 (15.7)
Additional skills were not required to manage the patient 8 (9.6)
No further clinical observations had been taken 6 (7.2)
Altered thresholds for RRS activation but not documented 4 (4.8)
Thought they were too junior to activate RRS 1 (1.2)
ICU, intensive care unit.
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reﬁne the coding of the qualitative responses for the
prospective case collection stage. These qualitative data
are contaminated in part by the knowledge that the
patients involved had suffered an adverse event (cardiac
arrest, unplanned ICU admission or death) following
a period of physiological instability. Interviews were
abandoned if conducted more than 72 h following the
adverse event. This led to a reduced number of inter-
views, but ensured that the data collected were fresh in
the respondents’ minds. Although the data from this
study come from a single organisation, the four acute
hospitals involved each have unique characteristics and
consequently we believe the results can be generalised.
CONCLUSION
There are two important messages from this study. First,
the main reason why staff did not follow the RRS acti-
vation protocol was not failure of cognition, but rather
local sociocultural factors and intra-professional hierar-
chies in the clinical areas. On this basis, we question the
value of efforts to improve RRS effectiveness by making
such patients more identiﬁable (eg, colour-coded
observation charts), the push for an increase in the
frequency of RRS activation and even the suggestion that
RRS protocols become mandatory. Instead, the results
suggest that there should be more effort in under-
standing individual and bedside cultural issues that may
be preventing staff from activating the RRS. For
example, in this study, referral to or involvement of
critical care teams, particularly when the critical care
unit has no beds, may confuse the situation for the
general bedside ward staff caring for the patient.
Second, implementing systems of care that signiﬁ-
cantly alter the traditional hierarchical referral model of
care, regardless of their potential beneﬁts, takes years to
appropriately implement. As mentioned above, we
believe this may reﬂect the lack of ‘face validity’ that
bedside staff may have for the RRS because of the
perceived poor sensitivity and speciﬁcity of the activa-
tion criteria. The decision of whether to activate the
R R Sw a so f t e nm a d eb yj u n i o rs t a f fm e m b e r sw h od on o t
have the clinical experience to safely make this decision.
While a RRS call gives junior staff members the oppor-
tunity to ask for help if they are uncomfortable with the
clinical situation, some clearly believed that their
colleagues expect them to cope with some situations.
This expectation was conﬁrmed by Stewart
27 in a study
across 21 hospitals in the UK which analysed decision-
making by pre-registration house ofﬁcers on whether or
not to call for senior help. This study found that the
decision to call for help is a complex judgement that
balanced the desire for clinical autonomy with the
understanding of certain consequences to self, senior
colleagues and patients. In our study, there was
a common belief that the treating team should be able
to deal with problems close to their area of specialty. For
example, the cardiothoracic surgery team would be able
to manage patients with tachy-arrhythmias but may
perhaps struggle to deal with patients who had a drop in
their Glasgow Coma Score. When deterioration
occurred within the area of specialty the junior staff
would be more likely to call senior nurses and doctors
within the specialty rather than activate the RRS. This
context sensitivity of the RRS has not previously been
described but appears to be a strong sociocultural inﬂu-
ence on whether junior staff activate the RRS.
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